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Mixing US and Dutch Approaches: Towards Curac;ao's 
Legislation on Private Commercial Spaceflight 
By Prof Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk, Nebraska* 
Abstract 
One of the more advanced projects to offer private commercial spaceflights 
concerns Cura~ao, the Dutch island in the Caribbean, from where Space Ex-
pedition Corporation (SXC) aims to start launching such flights as of 2014 
with vehicles to be developed by XCOR. Not only is the island still part of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, albeit as of recently as an autonomous 
'Land', SXC is a company with its origins in the Netherlands, too. On the 
other hand, XCOR, which is going to wet lease its vehicles to SXC, is a US 
company, and its operations consequently will - to the extent applicable -
(also) be licensed by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
Cura~ao is currently in the process of developing appropriate framework leg-
islation for the purpose, in order inter alia to appropriately implement the 
relevant international legal obligations as well as protect applicable public 
interests in this specific context. Moreover, for the above reasons such legisla-
tion will likely mix the Dutch and US approaches to licensing, authorising and 
monitoring the commercial spaceflights at issue. 
The present paper analyses in some detail the various international, US and 
Dutch legal interests interacting in this context, and how Cura~ao legislation 
would best guard all those public interests while not unnecessarily burdening 
SXC and/or XCOR with administrative or other obstacles to a safe and po-
tentially profitable business operation. 
1. Introduction 
Further to a previous paper in which some of the legal issues involved in the 
plans of then-Space Experience Cura~ao, now Space Expedition Corporation 
(SXC)l, to start launching from the Caribbean island of Cura~ao were ex-
plored2, this article represents an effort to analyse in greater detail how, pre-
* 
2 
Harvey & Susan Perlman Alumni / Othmer Professor of Space Law, University 
of Nebraska, College of Law, Space, Cyber and Telecommunications Law Pro-
gram. FvonderdunK2@unl.edu. 
See for the plans of SXC http://www.spacexc.com/enihome/; last visited 22 Oc-
tober 2013. 
See the author's Sun, Sea, Sand ... and Space: Launching Tourists into Outer 
Space from the Dutch Caribbean, in Proceedings of the International Institute of 
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sumably, both the US and the Dutch approach to handling private commercial 
spaceflight will combine in this particular case to, hopefully, arrive at a coher-
ent and balanced legal regime. 
Both domestic legal regimes in principle would be relevant, in view of some 
key facts of the planned activities. Following a referendum of 2009 Curalfao 
had become a 'Land' within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in October 2010, 
as a consequence obtaining a considerable measure of local autonomy. SXC, 
registered and headquartered in Curalfao, has contracted with XCOR, a US 
company, for the latter to develop its Lynx vehicle3 and then wet-lease it to 
SXC for its flights from Curalfao, which are scheduled to start in the course of 
2014.4 
As a consequence, Curalfao authorities are currently developing 'sub-
national', regional legislation which is, in principle, aiming to take both legal 
regimes into account as much as possible. This, obviously, raises the question 
as to the actual compatibility of the two regimes; in order to properly answer 
that question, firstly the main characteristics of both respective regimes will be 
analysed. Prior to that, however, a brief survey of relevant international law 
concepts is due. 
2. Key International Law Principles for Domestic Legislation with a View to 
Private Commercial Spaceflight 
In the four core treaties of the corpus juris spatialis internationalis, as drafted in 
the late 60s and first half of the 70s, there is no specific reference to private 
commercial spaceflight, or even to private space activities as such. The single 
exception, as to the latter, concerns the reference to "the national activities in 
outer space ( ... ) [of] non-governmental entities" in the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty. Such activities notably gave rise to international responsibility of the 
state(s) concerned, whereas at least "the appropriate State" was obliged to 
exercise "authorization and continuing supervision" over them,6 which in turn 
suggested the establishment of specific national (space) laws for the purpose? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Space Law 2010 (2011), 349-59. 
See for further details http://www.spacexc.com/en!space-program/spaceship/; 
last visited 22 October 2013. 
After a press release in the Spring of 2011 had kick-started relevant interest among 
target audiences, SXC is currently in the process of lining up its first customers, 
generally well-known public figures in Dutch society, and held its Cura\(ao 
Countdown Party on the island itself, on 1 September 2011. 
Art. VI, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer 
Space Treaty), London! Moscow IW ashington, done 27 January 1967, entered into 
force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 
No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967). 
Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty. 
See further e.g. E. Back Impallomeni, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, in 
Proceedings oJ the United Nations/Republic of Korea Workshop on Space Law -
ZL W 62. J g. 412013 
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One problem here is that the core concept of 'national activities' in outer 
space has never been satisfactorily defined, and hence interpreted in various 
fashion. In theory at least three generic interpretations have been put forward: 
the first simply equates 'national activities' to 'activities of nationals', 8 the 
second argues that 'national activities in outer space' of a state should equate 
with cases where that state also qualifies as a state liable for damage respective-
ly a state re~istering the satellite in an effort to make the various clauses easily 
compatible, and the third equates national activities for which a state can be 
held responsible with those over which it is entitled to exercise some form of 
generally accepted jurisdiction.1o This absence of consensus at the internation-
allevel on the precise meaning and scope of 'national activities' unfortunately 
is a recipe for states determining their own interpretation as suiting their par-
ticular interests, which makes the issue of complementarity of existing US and 
Dutch national space law and prospective Curalrao regional regulation a far 
from theoretical issue.11 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Actions at the National Level, ST/SPACE/22 (2004), 73-6; I. Marboe & F. Haf-
ner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mechanisms in Implementation 
of the UN International Space Treaties, in National Space Legislation in Europe 
(Ed. F.G. von der Dunk)(2011), 31 ff. 
This argument is predominantlr based on Art. IX, Outer Space Treaty, where a 
certain responsibility of a state for activities of its nationals IS expressly provided 
for. Cf. e.g. (with some reservations) K.H. Bockstiegel, The terms "appropriate 
State" and "launching State" in the space treaties - Indicators of state responsibili-
ty and liability for state and private activities, in Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1992), 13-4; A. Kerrest de Rozavel, Re-
marks on the resRonsibility and liaoility, in Proceedings of the Fortieth Colloqui-
um on the Law oJ Outer Space (1998), 139; F. Lyall & P.B. Larsen, Space Law - A 
Treatise (2009), 66. 
Cf. Artt. VII, VIII, Outer Space Treaty, as well as Art. I(c), Convention on Inter-
national Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention), 
LondoniMoscowlW ashington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 Septem-
ber 1972; 961 UNTS 187;11AS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 
5068; ATS 1975 No.5; 10 ILM 965 (1971); and Art. I(a), Convention on Registra-
tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), New 
York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 
15; TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No.5; 14 
ILM 43 (1975). Further e.g. V. Kayser, An achievement of domestic law: U.S. re-
~lation of private commercial launch services, 17 Annals of Air and Space Law 
(1991), 341-3; H.A. Wassenbergh, Public law a~ects of private space activities 
and space transportation in the future, in Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Collo-
quium on the Law of Outer Space (1996), 246. 
This would refer in particular to territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction over regIstered space objects and personnel thereof as l'er Art. VIII, 
Outer Space Treaty, and Art. II, Registration Convention. See further e.g. B. 
Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), 658-63; V.S. Vereshclietin, 
Space activities of "non-governmental entities": issues of international and domes-
tIC legislation, in Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of Ou-
ter Space (1984), 263; M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space (reprint 2010),114. 
Cf. for a broader analysis e.g. Marboe & Hafner, 57-61; M. Gerhard, Article VI, 
in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K.U. 
ZLW 62.Jg. 412013 
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A second key principle, already posited by Article VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty and further elaborated by the 1972 Liability Convention, concerns that 
of liability for damage caused by space activities - in this case, more precisely, 
caused by 'space objects'. Since such damage is allocated to the "launching 
State(s)" of the space object at issue,12 regardless of any level of private in-
volvement in development, construction, launch or operation of that space 
object, also this key principle at the very least suggests states to establish na-
tional means to deal especially with the international (third-party) liabilities 
arising as a consequence of such private involvement - whether by way of a 
comprehensive national space law or otherwise. 
After all, if a state allows private parties to launch and operate space objects in 
the first place - though in today's world simply assumed, already in view of 
the historical role of the communist Soviet Union, which did not recognize 
much private ownership of major enterprises, not necessarily a given - and 
then can be held liable, in principle even without limit13, for the ensuing ac-
tivities and the damage these might cause it would do well to ensure a measure 
of (legal) control over the operations of such private parties notably including 
title to (partial or complete) recovery by the states of compensation paid out 
in deference to the Liability Convention. 
A third main concept, following from Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and the ensuing 1975 Registration Convention, concerns the need for these 
same launching state(s) to arrange for registration, both in a national register 
and in an international register operated by the United Nations, of space ob-
jects launched14 - including, once again, those with partially or exclusively 
private involvement. In contrast, however, with the general inclination to ar-
range for authorisation, continuing supervision and liability by way of a full-
fledged, transparent and rather comprehensive licensing system as the core of a 
national space law, registration would often be handled through less onerous 
administrative means. 
For example, in the United States the State Department takes care of registra-
tion with the United Nations simply basing itself on information provided by 
other branches of the United States government and "the official U.S. Registry 
of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space".IS In the Netherlands, the 2007 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Schrogl), Vol. I (2009), 109, 111-4; the author's Towards 'Flags of Convenience' in 
Space? in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2012 (2013), 822-6. 
E.g. Artt. I(c), II, III, Liability Convention. The 'launching State' is defined by 
Art. I(c) as "(i) A State which launches or p'rocures the launching of a space ob-
ject; (it) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched". 
Cf. Art. XII, Liability Convention. 
See esp. Artt. II, IV, Registration Convention; further, on Art. VIII, Outer Space 
Treaty, B. Schmidt-Teda & S. Mick, Article VIII, in Cologne Commentary_ on 
Space Law (Eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K.U. Schrogl), Vol. I (2009), 146 ff. 
The register can be accessed through https:llwww.usspaceobjectsregistry.state. 
gov/pages/home.aspx; last visited 22 October 2013; also Space and Advanced 
ZL W 62. J g. 412013 
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Dutch Space Law16 included Section 11 on the creation of a Dutch register, 
with further details elaborated by implementing regulation. 
In any event, the legal framework sketched above by implication does also 
apply to private commercial spaceflight, calling for authorisation, continuing 
supervision and liability arrangements, and possibly registration requirements, 
most conveniently by way of a national space law, even if nothing within that 
legal framework specifically addressed the legal issues arising out of such pri-
vate space activities now having a manned character. 
Finally, beyond the three space treaties briefly discussed above the 1968 Res-
cue Agreement17 would enjoy some additional relevance in the field of private 
commercial spaceflight, as it inter alia addresses issues of space-farers being in 
distress. At the same time, the full applicability of the treaty to that sector and 
in particular to 'space tourists' immediately was put into doubt in view of its 
terminology: the rights to support and rescue were allocated to "personnel of 
a spacecraft", which moreover were usually equated with "astronauts" (with 
the lofty epithet "envoys of mankind"), as referenced in the full title of the 
Agreement and the underlying provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.18 
3. The US Regime for handling Private Commercial Spaceflight: Key Elements 
Further to general international space law, also the US regime for handling 
private commercial spaceflight principally bases itself, at least until now, on an 
adaptation of the regime for handling private commercial launches in general, 
as this developed from the enunciation of the 1984 Commercial Space Launch 
Act19 onwards. 
The key elements of this regime for the present purpose, notably after the 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Technology, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/satlindex.htm; last visited 22 October 
2013. 
Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a 
Registry of Space Objects (Dutch Space Law); original (in Dutch) in 80 Staatsblad 
(2007), at 1; English translation in Nationates Weltraumrecht / National Space 
Law (2008), at 201. 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement), Lon-
doniMoscowlW ashington, done 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 
1968; 672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; UKTS 1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786; 
ATS 1986 No.8; 7 ILM 151 (1968). 
Artt. 2-4, Rescue Agreement, resp. Art. V, Outer Space Treaty. See further e.g. 
S.R. Freeland, Up, Up and ... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Im-
pact on the International Law of Outer Space, 6 Chicago Journal of International 
Law (2005), 10-1; S. Hobe, Space Tourism as a Challenge to the Astronaut Con-
ceptI in The Astronauts and Rescue Agreement - Lessons Learned (Eds. G. Laffer-
randerie & S. Marchisio)(2011), 71-82. 
Commercial Space Launch Act, Public Law 98-575, 98th Congress, H.R. 3942, 30 
October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055; Space Law - Basic Legal Documents, E.III.3; in its 
current version codified as Commercial Space Transportation - Commercial Space 
Launch Activities, 51 U.S.c. 50901. 
ZLW 62.Jg. 412013 
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1988 Amendments had considerably fine-tuned the liability regime20, could be 
summarised as follows:21 
1. It provided for an obligation for any private company with US nationality 
or launching from US territory22 to obtain a license for each intended indi-
vidual launch of an object into outer space from the licensing agency, 
which was the Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial 
Space Transportation (now AST) within the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA). Also, it provided for a similar obligation for any private com-
pany intending to operate a launch site on US territory,23 In other words: 
the United States applied the requirement under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty to authorise and supervise "national activities in outer space" 
to launch activities conducted both under the territorial Gurisdiction) crite-
rion and under the nationality (personal jurisdiction) one. 
2. A number of conditions were imposed before a license would be granted, 
related to such general public interests as national security and abidance by 
international obligations.24 As is common practice amongst those national 
licensing systems for space activities which have been developed, those 
conditions were phrased in general and broad terms; the details could and 
would be either provided in implementing regulations or (more often) as 
per the individual license in view of the idiosyncrasies often accompanying 
specific prospective launch activities. 
3. Amongst the license requirements figured prominently an obligation to 
insure, up to an amount to be calculated using a rather complex process, 
against third-party liability claims for damage caused by the space objects 
to be launched, and to make sure that, in case the US government would be 
obliged to pay international compensation under the Liability Convention, 
it would be reimbursed up to that amount.25 Licensees could, alternatively, 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments, Public Law 100-657, 100th Con-
gress, H.R. 4399, 15 November 1988; 49 U.S.C. App. 2615; 102 Stat. 3900; Space 
Law - Basic Legal Documents, E.III.3, 13 ff. The most important changes resulted 
in caps on the liability of licensees, including as applicable to reimbursement of 
the US government in case the latter would have to payout claims under the Lia-
bility Convention; see also infra, at n. 25. 
See in general e.g. P. Vorwig, Regulation of Private Launch Services in the United 
States, m National Regulation of Space Activities (Ed. R.S. Jakhu)(2010), 405 H. 
Cf. Sec. 50904(a), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See Sec. 50904(a), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See Secc. 50905(a), (b), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
The process called for the calculation of the 'maximum probable loss' (MPL) 
potentially resulting from an accident of the space object (at least during its first 
phase), which would determine the reimbursable amount, unless that MPL was 
either hi~her than US$ 500,000,000 or higher than "the maximum liability insu-
rance aV3.1lable on the world market at reasonable cost"; in which cases the lower 
of the two latter amounts will constitute the reimbursable 3.1flount; cf. Sec. 
50914(a), (c), Commercial Space Launch Act. See further e.g. A. Kerrest de Roza-
ZL W 62. J g. 412013 
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show 'financial responsibility' up to the same amount for compliance 
here.26 
4. A similar licensing requirement pertained to damage which might be in-
flicted on US government property in the course of such activities, which 
in particular looked at the use of federal launch sites by private launch op-
eratorsP Whilst the first launch license was granted by the FAA in 1989 
and as of now well over 200 licenses have followed,28 the first launch site 
license was granted in 1996 with the current tally standing at eight29 - so 
far the overwhelming majority of private launches has indeed taken place at 
US government-owned launch sites. 
5. There was no reference in the Act to mandatory requirements regarding 
the certification of the hardware involved or the licensing of operating per-
sonnel involved in the launch activities (although this could be inserted in 
an individual license). With a view to often-made comparisons with air law, 
this clearly represents a different approach from international aviation, 
where an extended regime calls for certificates of airworthiness and licenses 
of personneI.3o 
6. With regard to contractual/inter-party liability, the Act essentially imposed 
an obligatory cross-waiver of liability between the launch service provider 
and any other contractual party: "A launch or re-entry license issued or 
transferred under this chapter shall contain a provision requiring the licen-
see or transferee to make a reciprocal waiver of claims with its contractors, 
subcontractors, and customers, and contractors and subcontractors of the 
customers, involved in launch services or reentry services under which 
each party to the waiver agrees to be responsible for property damage or 
loss it sustains, or for personal injury to, death of, or property damage or 
loss sustained by its own employees resulting from an activity carried out 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
vel & F.G. von der Dunk, Liability and Insurance in the Context of National Au-
thorisation in National Space Legislation in Europe (Ed. F.G. von der 
Dunk)(2011),141-50. 
See Sec. 50914(a)(3), (4), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See Sec. 50914(a)(1)(B), (3)(A)(ii), Commercial Space Launch Act. In this case, the 
same formula was folfowed as referred to supra, n. 25; only the maximum cap on 
liability in this context was established at US$ 100,000,000. 
See for a full list and further details http://www.faa.&ov/about/office_org/head 
quarters_offices/astllaunch_license/licensed_launches/lilstoricaUaunch/; last visi-
ted 22 October 2013. 
See The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2012, FAA, 
February 2013, 38. 
See Artt. 31, 32, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, done 7 De-
cember 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947; 15 UNTS 295; TIAS 1591; 61 Stat. 
1180; Cmd. 6614; UKTS 1953 No.8; ATS 1957 No.5; ICAO Doc. 7300; as further 
elaborated in Annexes 6, 'Operations Of Aircraft', and 8, 'Airworthiness Of Air-
craft'. 
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under the applicable license."31 A similar waiver was to be arranged for as 
between the licensee and any executive agency of the US government and 
its contractors.32 
7. In cases where other states are fundamentally involved in a particular 
launch activity outside US territory to be licensed, the application of the 
US licensing regime and attendant requirements may depend on an agree-
ment between the United States and the other state concerned, de facto al-
lowing the former to avoid 'double licensing' to the extent considered un-
necessary or unwanted from the US perspective.33 The extent to which the 
licensing authorities would allow for abstention from the exercise of US 
jurisdiction to impose a license obligation may be subject to rather severe 
constraints, in view of for example the extended US export controls re-
garding security-sensitive dual-use technology34, but at least the possibility 
is there in principle. 
When the 2004 deadline for the X-Prize contest came close, and with it the 
chance that somebody would actually (try to) win it, the FAA kick-started a 
process of regulation by allowing such flights on a one-off basis. With the 
victory of Scaled Composites and the ensuing establishment of Virgin Galactic 
this process quickly gave rise to the conclusion that the most appropriate way 
to handle such flights on a more consolidated basis in the future would be to 
adapt the regime of the Commercial Space Launch Act to the specifics of 
launches (and re-entries) with humans on board, rather than develop a sepa-
rate regime from scratch. The result was the 2004 Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act35 amending the 1984/1988 Act to achieve such goals, fol-
lowed by some further legal measures as part of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions36. 
Thus, in principle the above seven key elements had now become applicable to 
private manned spaceflight, although a few specifics were added to the existing 
regime to take account both of the additional issues flowing from the presence 
of humans on board of spacecraft launched (most fundamentally, the licensing 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Sec. 50914(b)(1), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See Sec. 50914(b)(2), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
Sec. 50904(a)(3), Commercial Space Launch Act, applies US jurisdiction in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary with another state, whereas vice versa 
Sec. 50904(a)(4) requires a relevant agreement to that extent to exist for the US re-
gime to appfy regarding relevant activities outside any state's territory. 
As per the Arms Export Control Act of 1976; 22 U.S.C. 2751; and the implemen-
ting International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs), respectively the Export 
Administration Act of 1979; Public Law 96-72, 96th Congress; 50 U.S.c. 2401; 93 
Stat. 503; and the implementing Export Administration Regulations (EARs). 
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, Public Law 108-492, 108th Con-
gress, 23 December 2004, 49 U.S.C.; 118 Stat. 3974. 
To wit 14 C.F.R. Ch. III, Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Department of Transportation. 
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obligation was now also applied to re-entry, whereas formerly it only applied 
to launches37) and the need for the FAA to stimulate, not stifle, this infant 
industry38. In particular key elements #1 through #4 however remained appli-
cable, albeit that the licensing obligation referred to under #1 was now dissect-
ed into a 'launch license' and an 'experimental permit'.39 
Most attention was paid to key elements #5 and #6, in particular since, as indi-
cated, in the field of commercial aviation - to which the impending private 
commercial spaceflight efforts were often likened, or at least compared4o -
hardware certification, personnel licensing and contractual liability exposure 
were standard features of the applicable legal regime, noting also that the FAA 
had decades of experience with that sector on those issues. 
It was decided, explicitly on a temporary basis - a sunset clause referred first 
to 2012, but has since been extended to October 201541 - by way of the 2004 
amendments that certification of the craft or licensing of the crew were not 
allowed to be undertaken by the FAA (yet), essentially since it was believed 
that only experience with actual flights might allow it to impose realistic and 
relevant certification and licensing requirements, given the relative novelty of 
the undertaking, and premature regulation would run the risk of stifling this 
infant industry.42 
Following up on this, furthermore, with reference to key element #6 the FAA 
did not extend the existing cross-waiver to spaceflight passengers, but rather 
allowed private spaceflight operators to offer their services to the general pub-
lic provided that their individual customers were informed in writing "about 
the risks of the launch and reentry, including the safety record of the launch or 
reentry vehicle type" and "that the United States Government has not certi-
fied the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants" -
the so-called 'informed consent'.43 Thus, passenger liability was essentially left 
unregulated, that is left to the courts to decide, who could honour an 'in-
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Cf. the definitions of Sec. 50902, Commercial Space Launch Act, notably sub (4) 
& (13), also Sec. 50904(a). 
Cf. also Sec. 50901(7), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See Secc. 50905, resp. 50906, Commercial Space Launch Act. 
Cf. e.g. P. van Fenema, Suborbital Flights and ICAO, 30 Air and Space Law 
(2005), 399-403; R. Abeyratne, Space Tourism - Parallel Synergies Between Air 
and Space Law?, 53 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (2004),184 ff. 
See Sec. 827, FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Public Law 112-95, 
112th Congress, 14 February 2012, amending Sec. 50905(c)(3), Commercial Space 
Launch Act. 
Cf. also Sec. 50905(c)(3), Commercial Space Launch Act: «Any such regulations 
shall take into consideration the evolving standards of safety m the commercial 
space flight industry." 
Sec. 50905(b)(5)(A), resp. (B), Commercial Space Launch Act. Further e.g. T. 
Knutson, What is 'Informed Consent' for Space-Flight Participants in the Soon-
To-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 Journal of Space Law (2007), 105-22, for 
an insightful analysis of that concept. 
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formed consent' based defence by the operator to bar recovery - but could 
also decide to ignore it. Instead of requiring compliance with a specific licens-
ing system for the crew furthermore, the regulations provided for what effec-
tively amounts to a toned-down 'informed consent' requirement for the crew: 
they should be equally informed "that the United States Government has not 
certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight partici-
pants".44 
The underlying reason for imposing what was consequently a relatively light 
regulatory regime upon private spaceflight operators was, again, the mandate 
of the FAA not only to regulate the private space sector, but also to stimulate 
it - a full-fledged certification-, crew licensing- and contractual liability-regime 
was feared to fundamentally run counter to that mandate. This, however, also 
means that as soon as private spaceflight would really take off, would gradual-
ly leave its infancy-stadium behind it and would allow the FAA to build up 
experience with actual flights, the administration at some point would start 
d~veloping a proper certification, crew-licensing and contractual liability re-
gIme. 
At the same time, the US situation has meanwhile been considerably compli-
cated by the decision of - so far - six states to draft their own statutes. In an 
attempt to clarify the legal baseline on contractual passenger liability, left 
hanging in mid-air by the federal 'informed consent' requirements, and to 
present themselves as attractive locations for commercial spaceflight operators 
and operations, these states formally and directly linked 'informed consent' to 
a waiver of immunity of operators operating under those resfective statutes.45 
The states concerned were, in chronological order, Virginia4 , Florida47, New 
Mexic048, Texas49, Colorad050 and California51. 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Sec. 50905(b)( 4 )(B), Commercial Space Launch Act. 
See further e.g. M.J. Kleiman, J.K. Lamie & M.V. Carminati, The Laws of 
Spaceflight (2012), 107-8; the author's Federal versus State: Private Commercial 
Spaceflight Operator Immunity Regulation in the United States, to be published 
in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (scheduleo 2014). 
Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act; Art. 24, Code of Virginia; Va. Code 
Ann. §§ 8.01-227.8 to 8.01-227.10 (2007). 
Space Activities Statute; Ch. 331, Sec. 501, Florida Statutes; Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 
331-501 (2009). 
Space Flight Informed Consent Act; S.B. 9, 49th Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2010); as of 
this writing,;n amen~It?-ent is making its way through the legislative process as per 
S.B. 240, 51 Leg.; Bill mtroduced by M.K. Papen. 
Space Activities Statute; S.B. 115, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 
Code, Title 4, Ch. 100A. 
Act Concerning Limited Liability for Spaceflight Activities; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 41-6-101. 
Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act; AB 2243, Cal. Civ. Code, Div. 3, Pt. 4, 
Title 7, Ch. 5, Art. 5. 
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4. The Dutch Regime for handling Private Commercial Spaceflight: Key Ele-
ments 
In the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of developments took 
place in the Dutch 'spacescape' calling for specific domestic regulatory 
measures. Notably this concerned the announcement by New Skies Satellites 
for 2002 of the launch of new satellites to augment its fleet, the existing satel-
lites all having been handed over at the creation of the company by 
INTELSAT.52 Hence, the Dutch government decided it had become neces-
sary for the purpose of properly implementing the outer space treaties, in 
particular Articles VI, VII and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as the 
Liability and Registration Conventions, to establish a national law allowing 
for and licensing private parties interested in undertaking space activities. 
Thus, in 2007 the Dutch Space Law was enunciated.53 
The Dutch Space Law, differendy from the US Commercial Space Launch 
Act, comprised in principle all possible activities in outer space. 54 With respect 
to the same seven key elements addressed in the above analysis of the US re-
gime, the result was a framework law to be summarised as follows: 
1. It provided for an obligation for anyone planning to undertake space activ-
ities from the territory of the Netherlands, Dutch ships or Dutch aircraft55 
to obtain a license ('vergunning') from the licensing agency, which was lat-
er determined to be the Telecom Agency within the Ministry of Transport. 
Thus, from the vantage point of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, dif-
ferendy from the US case Dutch authorisation and supervision was exer-
cised on a territorial and quasi-territorial basis, but not as such on that of 
personal jurisdiction. The obligation could however by way of special reg-
ulation be extended in certain cases to Dutch nationals operating outside of 
Dutch territory properly speaking.56 The above obligation extended also to 
the operation of a launch site on Dutch territory, as the 'space activities' 
subject to the licensing obligation included launching in general terms as 
well as conducting and guiding the flight.57 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
See on this also the author's Implementing the United Nations Outer Space Trea-
ties - The Case of the Netherlands, in Nationales Weltraumrecht / Natzonal Space 
Law (Eds. C. Briinner & E. Walter) (2008), 89 ff. 
See also supra, n. 16. 
Thus, the licensing obligation ratione materiae applies to "the launch, the flight 
operation or the guidance of space objects in outer space"; Sec. l(b), Dutch Space 
Law, see also Sec. 2(1). 
See Sec. 2(1), Dutch Space Law; also Sec. 3(1). 
See Sec. 2(2), Dutch Space Law; essentially this clause was included to cover cases 
where, in the absence of application of die Dutch Space Law under Sec. 2(1), no 
state might be held to apply its national law where die nationaliry- of the operators 
nevertheless provided fOr a link of those activities to the Netherlands. 
Cf. again Sec. l(a) in conjunction with Sec. 2, Dutch Space Law; it should be 
added that to the extent such launch site operations would ever take place on 
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2. The licensing authority was authorised (but not necessarily obliged) to 
impose a number of general conditions before granting a particular license; 
such conditions inter alia pertained to general public interests as J'ublic or-
der, national security, safety and protection of the environment.5 
3. In terms of reimbursement of any international liability claims to be paid 
by the Dutch government as a consequence of an accident with a space ob-
ject launched under a license, the licensee is required to insure himself at 
the highest level deemed appropriate by the responsible Minister, and if at 
issue, to reimburse the Dutch government up to that amount. 59 Contrary 
to US legislation, the Dutch regime does not provide for any particular 
method or approach to determine such a cap. 
4. For the simple reason that the Dutch government does not itself own or 
operate any launch facilities, unlike the US case there was no reference 
whatsoever to inter-party liability vis-a-vis the government for use of their 
launch facilities - or a waiver thereof. 
5. Similar to the US case, no reference to certification of hardware or licens-
ing of personnel was included in the Law, although as appropriate the gen-
eral conditions for example pertaining to safety or environmental protec-
tion could be used in individual cases for inclusion in a license of relevant 
obligations, further to #2 above. 
6. Further to key element #5 above, as well as further to a general approach 
within the Dutch legal system not to limit contractual parties in such re-
spects in their freedom to contract, also an obligatory cross-waiver 
amongst partners in a space venture was not to be found in the Law. 
7. The scope of the Law being principally restricted ratione loci to space ac-
tivities conducted from Dutch territory, as indicated the Law allows exten-
sion of that scope ratione personae by special regulation largely as might 
become necessary to apply Dutch jurisdiction where otherwise gaps in 
state control would appear,60 which allows for a somewhat unrefined yet 
fundamental alignment with another state's licensing regime should that 
latter state become involved through its territory being the primary territo-
ry of operation.61 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Dutch territory, it may be presumed that the J?articular licenses at issue would 
take care of any differentiatIOn between operatmg a launch site and operating a 
launch vehicle. 
See Sec. 3(3), Dutch Space Law. 
See Sec. 3(4), in conjunction with Sec. 12, Dutch Space Law. 
See supra at #1. 
See Sec. 2(2), Dutch Space Law, sub (a) referring to activities conducted by Dutch 
nationals from another state's territory, ships or aircraft if that state is not a party 
to the Outer Space Treaty, sub (b) referring to activities taking place outside the 
Netherlands but organiseiJ from within the Netherlands. 
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Like in the US case, this entire regime was originally developed with a clear 
focus on unmanned space activities - the Netherlands does not even have 
much of a history in manned spaceflight: the two Dutch nationals so far hav-
ing obtained astronaut status effectively were ESA astronauts operating in the 
framework of ESA programmes.62 Rather distinct from developments in the 
United States, however, in the Netherlands the advent of private commercial 
spaceflight did not give rise to any substantial discussion as regards the proper 
legal approach to this new category of private space activity. 
Partly, no doubt, this was due to a general tendency within the Netherlands to 
look for a broader solution than just a national one. This would refer either to 
the international context - where the International Civil Aviation Organisa-
tion (ICAO) had started to discuss the possible application of its general re-
gime pertaining to aircraft and aviation to suborbital flight already in 200563 -
or to the European context - where the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) likewise since a few years had been developing an approach to certifi-
cation of suborbital vehicles based on its approach with respect to aircraft64. It 
seems fair to say however that currently such efforts have been shelved, leav-
ing considerable uncertainty amongst European stakeholders as to how pri-
vate commercial spaceflight in the European context might come to be regu-
lated. Moreover, as to EASA, as an agency of the European Union the scope 
ratione loci of its activities remains confined to the European territories of the 
EU member states, not to - for example - Cura~ao.65 
It should be added, moreover, that at first none of the plans regarding 'space 
tourism' seemed to bear much relation to the Netherlands in any event. Thus, 
it did not seem necessary to address it specifically, as the general possibility of 
extending the scope of the Law to activities undertaken outside of the Nether-
lands yet organised from there was always available to include space tourism 
operators, if appropriate and required.66 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
This concerns Wubbo Ockels, who flew a 1985 Spacelab-mission, and Andre 
Kuipers, both in 2004 and in 2011-12 flying missions to the International Space 
Statton. 
See Working Paper on Concept of Suborbital Flights, ICAO Council, 175th Sessi-
on, 30 May 2005, C-WPI12436. 
See e.g'I.B. Marciacq et al., Towards Regulating Suborbital Flights: An Updated 
EASA pproach, Paper IAC-l0-D2.9.5, 61" International Astronautical Con-
gress, Prague, 2010. 
Cf. Art. 355(3), Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, Lisbon, done 13 December 2007, entered into 
force 1 December 2009; OJ C 115/47 (2009). 
As per Sec. 2(2), Dutch Space Law. Cf. Explanatory memorandum, at 17. The 
Dutch version of the Explanatory memorandum can be found in Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderl'aar 2005-2006, 30 609, nr. 3. For the unofficial 
English translation of the exp anatory memorandum, reference may be had to 
http://www.agentschap-telecom.nl!eplspace_activities_accexplanatory_note.pdf. 
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5. Towards a Regional Version of a National Space Law? 
The above situation changed substantially of course with the enunciation of 
SXC's plans to undertake private commercial spaceflights from Cura~ao, 
which happened to gain credence ray idly after the 2007 enunciation of the 
Dutch Space Law as sketched earlier.6 
The main problem rearing its head as a consequence resulted from the non-
applicability for political/historical reasons of the Dutch Space Law68 to the 
Caribbean parts of the Kingdom as juxtaposed with the international respon-
sibility and liability of the Kingdom under the space treaties, notably the Out-
er Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, which also extended to any 
such outlying parts.69 
In the above context, the political decision was fundamentally taken to not to 
use Section 2(2) of the Dutch Space Law to directly apply the licensing system 
to SXC's operations from Cura~ao but rather convince the regional Cura~ao 
government of the need and desirability to develop its own legislation - all the 
while, keeping within the general Dutch approach to and legal regime for pri-
vate space activities as reflected by the Dutch Space Law. 
From the other end, both because of the key involvement of US company 
XCOR in the SXC plans and because the US FAA had already developed a 
baseline regime specifically for private commercial spaceflight as outlined 
above, it was equally obvious that the Cura~ao regional legislation was to take 
that US regime into account as much as possible and sensible. 
Finally, of course, the Cura~ao government would through development of its 
own regional version of a domestic space law be able to insert into such legis-
lation typically local concerns, for example regarding employment or the envi-
ronment, and also to play into those parts of SXC's plans to back-up the 
spaceport operations properly speaking with an experience and 'edutainment' 
centre as well as a high-key technology knowledge hub. 
Although the respective relationships of the Netherlands and the United States 
to the island of Cura~ao are not at all comparable to those of the United 
Kingdom and the People's Republic of China to Hong Kong, the experience 
of the latter in some ways presented an interesting example of the possibility 
to draft a 'regional space law' for a special region, autonomous yet not sover-
67 
68 
69 
See further again the author's Sun, Sea, Sand ... and Sf>ace: Launching Tourists 
into Outer Space from the Dutch Caribbean, in Proceeaings 0/ the International 
Institute o/Space Law 2010 (2011). 
Sec. 2(1), Dutch Space Law, determines the scope of the Law ratione loci to "the 
Netherlands", wruch - differendy from the term 'the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands' - refers to the European territory of the Kingdom only. See further § 3.8, 
Explanatory memorandum. 
See Nederlandse Staatswetten, Editie Schuurman & Jordens, 104a (1981)1 at 3,12, 
18,29, for the respective ratifications by the Kingdom of the Netherlands of Ou-
ter Space Treaty, Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention and Registration Con-
ventIOn. 
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eign, taking care of relevant international space law obligations resting upon 
sovereign states. 
Hong Kong had, until 1997, formed part of the British Empire, and as such 
had been subject to the UK Outer Space Act of 1986 regulating private space 
activities conducted by UK nationals including Hong Kong citizens'?o The 
Outer Space Act amongst others provided for a licensing requirement includ-
ing reimbursement and insurance obligations, as well as specific requirements 
pertinent to licenses'?! 
Then, in 1997 Hong Kong reverted to the People's Republic of China, which 
did however allow the area to retain a status as Special Administrative Region 
(SAR), inter alia meaning that private enterprise was essentially allowed the 
same opportunities to conduct economic activities as before - including op-
portunities to conduct commercial space activities. On the other hand, obvi-
ously now the PRC was to be held potentially responsible and, as the case 
may be, liable for such space activities conducted from Hong Kong, and in 
addition wanted to see its security and other national interests duly protected 
in that context. 
As a consequence, much of the substance of the Outer Space Act was pre-
served by means of the 1997 Outer Space Ordinance72 which at the same time 
reflected the changes necessary as a conse~uence of the transition from Great 
Britain to the People's Republic of China'? 
While again obviously the situation regarding Curac;ao is fundamentally dif-
ferent in a number of respects, the principled possibility of a comprehensive 
regulation of private space activities applicable to just one part of a sovereign 
state whilst taking into account substantive law stemming from another sover-
eign state has been proven - and then, the legal systems of the Netherlands and 
the United States surely have more in common than those of the People's 
Republic of China and the United Kingdom. And at the end of the day, it is a 
matter of internal responsibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the 
internationally-relevant entity to make sure also space activities from its outly-
ing parts are compliant with its international responsibilities and liabilities 
under, for example, the UN space treaties. 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Outer Space Act, 18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38; National Space Legislation of the 
World, Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law - Basic Legal Documents, E.I; 36 Zeit-
schrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 12. 
See Secc. 4, 5, 10, Outer Space Act. 
Outer Sl'ace Ordinance, An Ordinance to confer licensing and other powers on 
the Chief Executive to secure compliance with the internanonal obliganons of the 
People's Republic if China with respect to the launching and operation of space 
objects and the carrying on of other activities in outer space, 13 June 1997, as 
amended 1999, Chapter 523; 51 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (2002), at 
50. 
Cf. e.g. Secc. 4(2) & (3), 5(2), 6, Outer Space Ordinance. 
ZLW 62.Jg. 412013 
von der Dunk / Towards Cura\(ao's Space Legislation 755 
6. Towards a Curarao Mix of Dutch and US Space Law? 
In actual fact, even the space law systems of the United States and the Nether-
lands, the two states principally involved in the context of Cura~ao and SXC's 
planned activities there, have a lot in common. 
Looking at the seven key elements of the national licensing systems for private 
space activities analysed above, when applying them to the specifics of com-
mercial manned spaceflight the following summary comparison should pro-
vide ample confidence that a logical and coherent solution could indeed be 
found - and that Cura~ao regional legislation would be most likely to follow 
both national regime to a considerable extent. 
On key element #1 both the Netherlands and the United States provide for a 
licensing obligation, where the Dutch is in essence narrower in primarily fo-
cusing on activities from Dutch soil as opposed to the United States applying 
its regime to launch activities both conducted from US soil and conducted by 
US nationals elsewhere. The possibilities offered respectively in both cases 
under key element #7 to acknowledge that another state's licensing regime 
could principally take care of many concerns and that 'double licensing' 
should be avoided as much as possible, however, allow - certainly in the case 
of Cura~ao - an easy solution to preclude any 'double licensing' of the same 
precise component of an activity from occurring in this respect. It thus also 
allows Cura~ao as appropriate to limit 'double licensing' to a minimum. 
The conditions under which a license should or might be granted, under key 
element #2, are essentially similar in general substance, so that also in this re-
spect any possibility to waive a license or a specific licensing obligation could 
streamline the licensing process and make way for appropriate Cura~ao re-
gional regulation alternatively allow Cura~ao to waive certain requirements 
with reference to US requirements whilst staying true for all practical purpos-
es to the substance of the Dutch regime. Key elements #3 and #4, pertaining to 
liability reimbursement and insurance, are relatively easily aligned as well in 
the context of a Cura~ao regulation, in view of the fact that the Dutch regime 
does not provide for much detail to begin with. 
This leaves only key elements #5 and #6 to be more thoroughly discussed, as 
to which regime to follow in the Cura~ao context, alternatively to allow a 
license granted under it to take away the need to that extent to license in the 
Cura~ao context. 
With regard to #5, the Netherlands might have felt somewhat inhibited by the 
EASA efforts mentioned, and may have looked for any further legal develop-
ment in the Dutch context to start from aviation certification and licensing and 
then try to mould that to the specifics of private commercial spaceflight. Such 
an approach however would run counter to the US approach to start from 
scratch, and only gradually build up certification and licensing requirements as 
the sector - and experience - grows, not to stifle the industry in its infancy. 
However, even regardless of whether EASA will succeed in having its views 
accepted (which is increasingly doubtful now in any event), as indicated Cura-
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~ao may formally ignore such developments as the scope of EASA - as an 
agency of the European Union - is confined to the European territories of the 
member states. Moreover, there is no question that experience with private 
commercial spaceflight both in the Netherlands and in Cura~ao - and eveb in 
Europe as a whole - is even more minimal than in the United States. 
With regard to #6, finally, the ultimate decision in Cura~ao may go either way. 
The presumed infant-industry-friendly approach of a cross-waiver under the 
US national regime could, at least in principle, be preserved in the context of 
the Cura~ao regime, as not only the local government and constituents but 
also the Dutch are indeed interested in stimulating this new sector. In the al-
ternative, if the concept of a cross-waiver is considered too alien to Cura~ao 
(and Dutch) legal habits, other means could certainly be found to address 
those interests in seeing private commercial spaceflight taking off. 
In short: as the Cura~ao government is currendy pondering its options, there 
is certainly no need for fundamental delays because of any incompatibility 
between the Dutch legal order - from which the Cura~ao one in general terms 
has evolved, and also in the space context might well be closely adhered to -
and the US legal regime - the application of which is, in principle, premised on 
the key role of XC OR in the plans of SXC. At least from that perspective, 
therefore, the prospects for arriving at a suitable high-level framework region-
al regulation - and thus the possibilities for SXCIXCOR to actually start fly-
ing - in the course of 2014 would not face insurmountable obstacles. 
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